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Controversies over the development, legality, or 
implementation of environmental, health, and 
safety regulation often focus on the nature and 
quality of the relevant technical information, as 
well as on access to that information, and on how 
it is used. One of the more serious questions that 
regulators face is uncertainty in both the available 
data and methods for analyzing the data. A review 
of how and where such information comes into 
play can provide guidance to understanding the 
essentials of the regulatory process itself. The fol- 
lowing discussion is presented as a quick primer 
for those who may be less familiar with this area 
of public policy analysis. 
Information Uses 
Research That Precedes or \ustifies Regulatory 
Decisions 
Virtually all substantive regulatory decisions con- 
cerning health, safety, and the environment require 
the i ut of data and the application of analytic 
methods for their interpretation. Such data may 
include toxicological or epidemiological infor- 
mation about the effects of a chemical present in 
food or the environment, physiological information 
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about the consequences of a certain kind of injury, 
tcchnological information about the effectiveness 
of a pollution control device, or any of a wide 
array of data on specific scientific or technical 
topics. 
Sometimes the information needed pertains only 
to a narrow question or dispute, such as the effects 
of human exposure to one specific chemical. 
However, although the regulatory agencies do 
conduct some research, it is generally beyond their 
resources to dcvclop all their own information, 
and so they must rely on outside sources, usually 
academic or private research organizations or the 
nonregulatory, science-based federal agencies. 
Additional data may be drawn from studies spon- 
sored or conducted by private industry. 
Some information cannot be generated in ad- 
vance of the instigation of a regulatory action 
becausc the data are privately held, cannot be 
located, or do not exist. The agencies therefore 
may need to support or encourage innovative re- 
search that justifies an immcdiatc regulatory re- 
sponse, even if data are incomplete. For example, 
current attention to the risk of carcinogenic effects 
of exposure to formaldehyde resulted from a 
Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology study 
of cancer in animals. In this case, regulatory action 
has been delayed because of disagreement on how 
[or whether) to extrapolate the animal data to 
humans, and because human data are not available 
at  present. Long-term innovative research will help 
in constructing and validating models that address 
the general problem of interspecies comparisons. 
Meanwhile, the regulatory decisions about for- 
maldehyde must be madc. 
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Dispute Resolution 
Regulatory decisions often require the resolution 
of scientific or technical questions. For example, 
it may be necessary to determine which of several 
studies should be given the most credence or 
whether an investigator’s methodology was sound. 
Before an agency can begin to examine regulatory 
policy toward a specific hazard, it must evaluate 
the information that exists, determine what in- 
formation is lacking, and, as necessary, seek ad- 
ditional scientific or technical input. 
Argument and persuasion on technical grounds 
can, of course, resolve some disputes. There may 
be a strong consensus of scientific opinion which, 
while not verifiable beyond all doubt, is never- 
theless considered scientifically or technically re- 
liable. General acceptance of the proposition that 
vinyl chloride causes human cancer provides a 
good example of such consensus. Some technical 
disputes are resolvable; here, agreement may be 
reached without resort to policy considerations. 
The issues to be resolved in such a technical dis- 
pute resolution are usually both specific deter- 
minations of scientific or technological import, 
and, in certain cases, priority-setting for agency 
action in risk assessment and hazard control. A 
number of vehicles-including advisory commit- 
tees, blue-ribbon panels, improved agency coor- 
dination, and adversarial hearings-assist the reg- 
ulatory agencies in dispute resolution. But parties 
(including the government) that control a dispro- 
portionate share of scientific, legal, and other re- 
sources may also have an undue influence on the 
outcome of regulatory disputes. Even when purely 
factual matters are at issue, resolution can depend 
on the availability of information and the ability 
to present it effectively: Some parties can simply 
produce and disseminate data and arguments better 
than others. Mechanisms to ensure effective public 
participation in the decisionlriaking process are 
therefore essential. 
Uncertainty 
Regulatory agencies also constantly face situations 
in which good technical information fails to resolve 
fully or satisfactorily the fundamental policy 
questions. Even when the health or safety payoffs 
of a number of strategies are known, the policy 
decision of how much protection to require and 
at what Cost will remain a problem-but not a 
scientifichechnical problem. With uncertain or 
equivocal information, how far to go becomes a 
policy decision that must account for uncertainty 
in the data. And so the management of uncertain 
risk has and continues to be a major problem. 
Using existing data, agencies must make judg- 
ments that involve legal, political, and value-laden 
considerations. This situation, in turn, gives rise 
to many questions about how the science is fac- 
tored into such judgments. 
The Role of the Courts 
The judicial system is an important actor in the 
regulatory process. The courts, particularly at the 
appellate level, play a crucial role in the outcome 
of regulatory activities. In the United States, for 
example, regulations and standards are subject to 
judicial review, and can be overturned, modified, 
or remanded. Many agency decisions that are pre- 
liminary to the issuance of a final agency action 
are taken with a view to their possible effect on 
subsequent litigation. 
In overseeing agency rulemaking activities, 
courts have differed widely in their approaches. 
Some give the government great discretion and 
decline to meddle in technical and value judg- 
ments, confining their scrutiny to procedural 
matters; others have evaluated more actively all 
aspects of regulatory outcomes, acting almost as 
partners in the process. The wide range of action 
(and opinion of that action) perhaps understandably 
provokes inquiries about the courts’ competence 
to decide different types of issues and about the 
appropriate level of their involvement in the de- 
cisionmaking process as a whole. 
Current Values Issues in Regulatory 
Poli cyma king 
Analyses of government environmental, health, 
or safety regulatory policy exhibit a number of 
common themes, many of which are addressed 
in  the essays published in this special issue of 
Science, Technology, eS Human Values. For 
example: 
the value-laden nature of the stages and pro- 
cesses involved in regulatory decisionmaking, 
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including the funding of research, the use of 
scientific data, decisionmaking under unre- 
solvable uncertainty, and the monitoring of 
programs; 
0 the role of political and economic power and 
influence in determining the outcome of sci- 
entific as well as value disputes; 
the importance of determining priorities in 
research and policymaking, and the need to 
target resources; 
the interrelation among all aspects of the reg- 
ulatory process, the difficulty of separating 
scientific and policy judgments, and the need 
to coordinate the different aspects; and 
the importance of ensuring broad public rep- 
resentation and participation at all stages of 
regulatory decisionmaking. 
Sources of Funding 
When a concerned participant in the regulatory 
process-such as a regulatory agency, industry, 
or public-interest organization-funds the research, 
the results may be biased or unreliable. Moreover, 
the recent debates over industry funding of uni- 
versity-based research call into question the in- 
dependence of even the traditionally neutral ac- 
ademic researcher. The agencies themselves are 
also sometimes accused of ignoring negative find- 
ings. One crucial issue is thus the need for the 
institution or reform of appropriate mechanisms 
to promote objective review of research. If gov- 
ernment support of research by interested or non- 
neutral participants is questionable, how can re- 
liable data be produced? 
Choice of Projects 
A related concern is the choice of subjects and 
methods and the setting of priorities. What will 
be studied? How, and at what rate, will it  be 
investigated? Is research being diverted into areas 
in which significant hazards are unlikely to be 
found, thereby leaving more serious questions 
unexamined? Or are resources concentrated on 
readily apparent problems to the exclusion of more 
subtle ones? Many observers believe that, for ex- 
ample, the problems of reproductive hazards are 
addressed inadequately in current research pro- 
grams. How should regulatory priorities research 
be determined? And by whom? 
Choice of Researchers 
The individual investigator can have a major im- 
pact on a research study; personal values and 
ideologies influence the choice of problem, the 
ways they are examined, and how the results are 
reported. If certain types of researchers are sys- 
tematically included in or excluded from partic- 
ipating in research related to regulatory policy, 
for example, how will that affect the kinds of 
results produced? 
Reporting of Results 
The way in which research results are reported 
can also affect how they are perceived. Should 
agencies be required, for example, to report their 
findings in such a way that ’the general public 
can understand their significance to the agency’s 
decision? Many commentators have argued the 
need for a comprehensive legal reporting require- 
ment pertaining to research or data relevant to 
public welfare, such as now required for health 
and safety data in Section 8(e) of the Toxic Sub- 
stances Control Act. Should results always be 
presented in a form that maximizes public un- 
derstanding and acceptability, or in a form con- 
venient and useful to the decisionmakers? 
Access to Results and Confidentiality 
Agency access to information does not insure ac- 
cess by the affected public. When reporting re- 
quirements are absent, the public’s access to data 
may be hampered further by, for example, ex- 
emptions from disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act, What if an agency’s collection, 
reporting, or use of scientific data impinges on 
trade secrets? Information sought for regulation 
may also go far beyond “neutral” scientific or 
technical data. Economic data and use profiles, 
for example, raise questions of proprietary infor- 
mation. When should proprietary interest ovemde 
societal need for information? 
Separating Technical and Regulatory Decisions 
Should decisions on scientific issues be separated 
from regulatory policy determinations? This goal 
was one rationale for the creation of science courts. 
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Such separation is not possible, of course, where 
the technical data are uncertain. The calculation 
of causal inferences from inconclusive studies or 
the prediction of technological response to reg- 
ulation, for example, are themselves value-laden 
and, hence, policy-relevant determinations. Sim- 
ilarly, decisions regarding research priorities cannot 
be divorced from policy. 
How much discretion should be permitted an 
agency? To the extent permitted by law, an agency 
must exercise discretion in setting priorities where 
uncertainty of the payoffs exists. Policies made 
under these conditions will necessarily reflect 
general attitudes toward risks and risk postures 
in light of incomplete data. Some attention to 
improving decisionmaking under uncertainty by 
devising new analytic approaches has already been 
suggested, but wherever an agency has broad dis- 
cretion for making decisions based on uncertain 
data, someone will always be critical of the policy 
adopted and many will disguise this criticism as 
displeasure with the resolution of the factual 
issues. 
Reform Initiatives 
A number of specific proposals have been made 
for changing the regulatory process. In addition 
to considerations of efficiency and procedure, such 
proposals reflect various political and ideological 
perspectives on the role of govenunent regulation. 
Common types of reform proposals include: 
0 improvements in scientific and technical in- 
formation for agencies, Congress, the courts, 
and the private sector; 
0 using science courts to resolve technical 
disputes; 
0 requiring the use of formal or quantitative 
risk assessment for regulatory action; 
0 requiring the use of cost-benefit analysis as 
a predicate to regulatory action; 
0 a regulatory “budget” that limits the extent 
to which an agency may impose an economic 
burden through regulation; 
using the legislative veto as a check on agency 
regulatory decisions; 
shifting responsibility for hazard control to 
the states or the private sector; 
imposing financial liability on the government 
when government regulations fail; 
enacting job and technology redesign as a 
national policy; 
developing economic incentives to supple- 
ment or substitute for government regulation; 
encouraging collective bargaining between 
labor and management as a supplement or 
substitute for occupational health and safety 
regulation; 
increasing citizen involvement in the regu- 
latory process; and 
encouraging private lawsuits for regulatory 
law enforcement and for injunctive relief/ 
damages. 
Each of these mechanisms has the potential to 
provide advantages for different participants in 
the regulatory process. Each engenders substantive, 
occasionally even harsh criticism. And, as this 
quick review of the processes and key issues has 
shown, each proposal also carries along its own 
value considerations, a dimension that must not 
be lost in the technical debates over procedures 
or politics. 
Conclusion 
The functioning of a regulatory process that relies 
on scientific and technical information requires 
considerable attention to ( 1) minimizing uncer- 
tainty in scientific/technical information and an- 
aIytic methods, (2) providing democratic and 
competent mechanisms for scientifichrans-sci- 
entific dispute resolution, and (3) enforcement and 
monitoring (evaluating) the performance of agency 
programs in order to provide feedback and op- 
portunities for redirection. The success of the reg- 
ulatory system thus depends on both the nature 
and quality of the utilized technical information 
and on  effective and democratic decisionmaking 
processes. 
